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1. Introduction 
The European Union’s (EU) main executive body, the 
European Commission, routinely consults experts, and 
is reliant on knowledge as its main source of legitimacy 
(Boswell, 2008a; Dehousse, 2011; Ross, 1995). The in-
creasing role of experts challenges established ideas of 
accountability and democratic decision-making and has 
spurred tension at the supranational level, contributing 
to the democratic deficit debate and the technocratic 
image of the EU (Featherstone, 1994; Radaelli, 1999). 
The most recent manifestation of this criticism came in 
October 2014 when the European Parliament placed a 
moratorium on funding for Commission expert groups, 
accusing them of being closed, dominated by vested 
corporate interests and lacking transparency (Alter-EU, 
2014). As a result, the Commission has faced growing 
external pressure to change its expert advice approach 
and arrangements.  
In response to critics, the Commission has pub-
lished a number of publicly available documents exam-
ining the role and use of knowledge and expertise in 
EU policy-making. What can we expect from these 
documents? Which positions and perspectives will 
most likely prevail? The article addresses this question 
by contrasting two competing theoretical approaches. 
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A branch of organizational theory—we refer to its rep-
resentatives as “the cynics”—would hypothesize that 
public communications of this nature are primarily 
cosmetic and to be viewed with skepticism as organiza-
tions will engage in symbolic rhetoric to defuse exter-
nal criticism, obfuscate real motives, and defend existing 
internal structures. An alternative, deliberative perspec-
tive would anticipate that the Commission adopts a rela-
tively open, reflective approach based on reason-giving. 
The article’s main aim is to assess the relative merits of 
the two theoretical perspectives in capturing the Com-
mission’s framing of its public communication. 
The next section introduces central features of the 
Commission’s use of expert advice, and elaborates on 
recent controversies and criticisms that have been 
raised against the Commission’s expert policies and 
practices. It is argued that critics attack the Commis-
sion for disregarding democratic concerns, but also for 
their strategic use of expertise. The following section 
presents the cynics’ and deliberativists’ competing ap-
proaches in more detail and spells out operational hy-
potheses. Section 4 reflects on data and methods, and 
is followed by section 5 which presents the analysis of 
the Commission’s documents and main findings. It is 
argued that cynical expectations are confirmed by the 
Commission’s silence on unpleasant topics. However, 
the introduction of regulatory initiatives and the Com-
mission’s critical engagement with democratization 
demands and possible goal conflicts within the critics’ 
agenda, give significant leverage to a deliberative ap-
proach. The final section sums up the article and delin-
eates a few implications. 
2. The Commission under Fire:  Democratic Deficit and 
Strategic Knowledge Utilization  
Expertise is deeply entrenched within the institutional 
structure of the EU (Böhling, 2014; Boswell, 2008a; Eg-
eberg, Schaefer, & Trondal, 2003; Radaelli, 1999; Rim-
kute & Haverland, 2014; Schrefler, 2010), and the Eu-
ropean Commission, in particular, is reliant on 
knowledge and expert advice in lieu of a direct elec-
toral mandate (Moodie, 2011; Trondal, 2001). In addi-
tion to its in-house expertise, the Commission now 
routinely consults external experts to assist in the for-
mulation and implementation of policy (Metz, 2013; 
Schaefer, 2002). This recourse to expert knowledge 
and advice is reflected in the development of a large 
number of EU-level agencies, comitology committees 
and expert groups (Christiansen & Kricher, 2000; Chris-
tiansen & Larsson, 2007; Gornitzka & Sverdrup, 2008, 
2010; Joerges & Neyer, 1997; Larsson, 2003; Pedler & 
Schaefer, 1996; Stie, 2013; Vos, 1997). 
The growing number of expertise-based bodies at 
the supranational level has served to increase academ-
ic interest in the different functions of knowledge in EU 
policy-making (Haas, 2004; Radaelli, 1995). Building on 
literature examining knowledge utilization in public 
policy-making (Weiss, 1979, 1986, 1999), EU scholars 
have developed different ingrained conceptualizations 
of the Commission’s uses of expertise, but discussions 
have tended to circulate around three main functions: 
the instrumental, the substantiating and the symbolic 
(Boswell, 2008a; Radaelli, 2009; Rimkute & Haverland, 
2014; Schrefler, 2010).1  
The Commission uses knowledge instrumentally 
when it turns to experts to provide background infor-
mation, “evidence” and technical solutions to help assist 
in task performance, enhance understanding, increase 
the number of policy options available, and improve the 
quality of policy outputs (Boswell, 2008a; Haas, 2004; 
Majone, 1996; Radaelli, 2009; Rimkute & Haverland, 
2014; Scharpf, 1999; Schrefler, 2010; Weiss, 1977). The 
instrumental use of expertise is viewed as central for en-
suring the Commission’s institutional autonomy and so-
cial legitimacy: its authority rests decisively on its ability 
to act in a neutral manner and base policies on sound 
evidence, rather than on political or strategic interests 
(Boswell, 2008a; Majone, 1996; Rimkute & Haverland, 
2014). The instrumental function is also intimately linked 
to a standard approach to the normative legitimacy of 
expert involvement in policy-making: if expert involve-
ment is defensible, it is defensible—or so it is often ar-
gued—on the grounds that it contributes to better and 
more “truth-sensitive” decisions, increases problem 
solving capacity and contributes to more effective poli-
cies (Christiano, 2012; see also Martí, 2006).  
However, the way an organization actually uses ex-
pertise seldom fits neatly with the doctrine of instru-
mental knowledge utilization (Groenleer, 2009; Schre-
fler, 2013). Knowledge serves a substantiating function 
when expertise is used selectively to justify predeter-
mined policy decisions, whereas the symbolic function 
of knowledge refers to institutions’ use of expertise to 
enhance their position and power vis-à-vis other insti-
tutions and stakeholders (Haas, 2004; Herbst, 2003; 
Boswell, 2008; Rimkute & Haverland, 2014; Schrefler, 
2010). The latter then is more about demonstrating 
competence and “epistemic authority”, than about en-
lightening the case in question or solving specific policy 
problems (Geuss, 2001; Rimkute & Haverland, 2014).  
These non-instrumental political or strategic uses of 
expertise2 are less official. Most bureaucrats, including 
Commission officials, are, however, likely to be well 
                                                          
1 What Schrefler (2010) identifies as the “symbolic” function of 
knowledge is referred to by Boswell (2008) and Rimkute and 
Haverland (2014) as the “legitimizing” function. Radaelli (2009) 
and Schrefler (2010) also refer to the “political strategic” use of 
knowledge; however, as Rimkute and Haverland (2014) point 
out, this use is closely interlinked with the symbolic function. 
2 In this article we will use the terms “strategic”, “political”, 
“politicized” and “non-instrumental” interchangeably when re-
ferring these utilizations of expertise. 
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acquainted with them (Aberbach, Putnam, & Rockman, 
1981; Boswell, 2008; Ellinas & Suleiman, 2012). The po-
litical functions of knowledge in EU policy-making have 
also been given substantive attention in research, 
where some contributors have presented the Commis-
sion as a power-hungry organization that is adept at 
utilizing expertise strategically in order to enhance its 
policy preferences and competences (Green-Cowles, 
1995; Eising, 2007; Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989). 
Criticism of the Commission’s political, non-
instrumental uses of expertise has been raised outside 
academia as well. The role of knowledge and experts in 
EU policy-making has for a long time been a highly con-
tested topic. In the early 1990s, a number of public 
controversies surrounding new risks and transforma-
tive technologies (genetically modified crops, biofuels, 
mad cow disease, stem cells, etc.) contributed to in-
creased public skepticism towards the scientific estab-
lishment and the EU’s expertise reliance (Fischer, 2008). 
The resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999 over 
allegations of corruption and nepotism further under-
mined public confidence in the Commission and gave 
fuel to the Eurosceptic critique that Europe is dominat-
ed by an unelected and unaccountable technocratic 
elite (Featherstone, 1994; Harcourt & Radaelli, 1999; 
Presson, 2007; Rhinard, 2002; Wallace & Smith, 1995). 
The 2008 financial crisis has once more served to en-
hance the Commission’s technocratic image, as the Troi-
ka has become a symbol of the “façade democracy” or 
“post-democratic executive federalism” that is develop-
ing in the Union, according to critics (Habermas, 2012; 
Majone, 2014; Offe, 2014). More concretely, the Euro-
pean Commission expert group system has been criti-
cized for being closed and dominated by vested corpo-
rate interests. This led the European Parliament, in 
October 2014 (and previously in November 2011 and 
March 2012), to place a moratorium on expert group 
funding until the Commission met demands to balance 
the composition of expert groups, develop an open calls 
system for the recruitment of members, and introduce 
fuller transparency measures (Alter-EU, 2013, 2014). 
Critics of the Commission have coalesced around 
demands for greater “democracy” and “democratiza-
tion” of expertise as an antidote to the increased lev-
erage of experts and technocrats (Gornitzka & 
Sverdrup, 2008; Metz, 2013). However, critics are 
equally worried about political knowledge utilization 
and the Commission becoming what one critic, MEP 
Ingeborg Grassle, has described as a “self-serving bu-
reaucracy” (cited in Dehousse & Thompson, 2013). A 
recurrent accusation is that the Commission utilizes 
expertise strategically to pursue predetermined policy 
goals and increase its own power. The problem is not 
only a lack of respect for “democracy”, but also politi-
cized modes of knowledge utilization that compromise 
instrumental knowledge utilization and the quality of 
policy outputs. As Alter-EU representative Yiorgos Vas-
salos (2013) notes: “when the expertise, on which a 
policy or legislation is based, is biased, the possibilities 
of getting a bad policy result increase—namely a policy 
that serves the interests of those capturing the advice 
rather than the general interest.”  
3. Analyzing the Commission’s Public Communication: 
A Cynical Versus a Deliberative Approach 
Critics’ suspicions that the Commission is engaged in 
political knowledge utilization seem to reflect a more 
deep-seated skepticism towards the Commission’s ini-
tiatives and responses. Accordingly, when the Commis-
sion has replied to criticism of its use of and approach 
to expertise, critics typically read this communication 
flow as cosmetic and failing to engage substantially 
with the concerns raised: “The Commission gives the 
impression that it is rather looking for alternative ways 
to keep up its privileged relationship with corporate in-
terests than looking to express the majority of citizens” 
(Vassalos, 2013). The Commission is “found wanting”, 
and accused of “broken promises” behind a façade of 
“commitment to reform”: “Commission commitments 
currently (are) just hot air” (Alter-EU, 2013). 
Is this rather cynical reading of the Commission’s 
response to the criticism of its expert policies and prac-
tices fair? We will investigate this question on the basis 
of an organizational theory approach which links close-
ly with this cynical perspective. These are theories of 
organizational behavior claiming that any organiza-
tion’s main aim is to survive and enhance its autonomy 
and authority (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Meyer & 
Scott, 1983; Scott, 2004). The typical strategy in situa-
tions of external pressure is then to adopt “smooth 
talk” and cosmetic rhetoric to placate critics and create 
a façade of compliance with their demands without se-
riously undermining the coherence of the organiza-
tion’s internal structures and priorities (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983). Meyer and Rowan (1977) refer to this as 
“institutional decoupling”; Nils Brunsson (2002) talks 
about “organized hypocrisy”. Central to these theories 
are the various mediums through which an organiza-
tion can interact “hypocritically” with their external 
environment, including official documents. From a cyn-
ical perspective, there is thus need to approach such 
documents with caution and skepticism, and as for or-
ganizations’ public communication under pressure, the 
prediction would be little, substantial engagement with 
critics’ concerns and demands. Genuine deliberations 
are perceived to take place in “private” or “back stage” 
settings only, whereas public “front stage” communica-
tion is imagined more as a public relations exercise. 
Even cynics, however, would have to differentiate 
between different organizations and how their core 
norms and activities will vary according to their struc-
ture, demography, locus and level of institutionaliza-
tion (Egeberg, 2004, pp. 201-205). Organizational theo-
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ry argues that the relative strength of an organization’s 
internal culture and norms will determine the nature of 
its response to external criticism (Boswell, 2008b; 
Meyer & Scott, 1983; Scott, 2004). In the case of the 
Commission, analyses tends to emphasize how it has 
developed “its own ethos and a strong esprit de corps”, 
having become “‘the House’, as it is referred to collo-
quially and affectionately by its staff” (Egeberg, 2004, 
p. 214; see also Dehousse, 2011, Egeberg et al., 2003, 
Ross, 1995, Shore, 2000, p. 127, Trondal, 2001). Such 
high levels of organizational identification would suggest 
a strong inclination among Commission officials to pro-
tect the “House” ethos when faced with external criti-
cism. Hence, if there is something to cynics’ expectations 
of hypocritical decoupling within an organization, then 
the Commission would seem a most likely case.  
Specific cynical hypotheses (CH) about the Commis-
sion’s public communications on its use of expertise 
follow from this perspective concerning the approach 
to 1) critics’ positions, 2) inconsistencies in critics’ ar-
guments and 3) unpleasant topics for the Commission. 
With regard to 1, we could expect the Commission to 
agree with critics’ views to reduce external pressures, 
and so subscribe to the virtues of the official doctrine of 
instrumental knowledge utilization (CH1a), support de-
mands to democratize Commission policy-making and 
expertise arrangements (CH1b), while denouncing stra-
tegic uses of knowledge (CH1c). With regard to 2, we 
could for similar reasons anticipate little or no focus on 
revealing the possible goal conflict between instrumen-
tal knowledge utilization and critics’ democratization 
demands (CH2a). Finally, with regard to 3, the expecta-
tion would be little or no acknowledgment of undemo-
cratic features of current Commission arrangements 
(CH3a), and no mentioning of the politicized knowledge 
utilization practices within the Commission’s own ranks 
(CH3a) in order to avoid more critical exposure.  
We will contrast the cynical approach and the 
above hypotheses with an alternative deliberative ap-
proach with competing expectations as to the Commis-
sion’s communications on its expert policies and prac-
tices. Political philosopher Joshua Cohen (1997, p. 72) 
describes deliberative democracy and politics as being 
characterized by a “commitment” among participants 
“to the resolution of problem and collective choice 
through public reasoning” (see also Bohman & Rehg, 
1997; Chambers, 2003; Gutmann & Thompson, 2004; 
Besson & Marti, 2006; Mansbridge & Parkinson, 2012). 
One could argue that a legitimate rule should be “de-
liberative”, while at the same time denying that delib-
eration characterizes politics as it is currently practiced. 
However, deliberative theorists typically expect that 
deliberation takes place: “Rational choice” and “strate-
gic calculations of mutual advantage” are central to po-
litical processes and discussion, but “reason-giving” is a 
primary coordinating mechanism (Eriksen, 2014, pp. 
14, 26; see also Eriksen, 2009).  
The deliberative approach also generally anticipates 
a positive relationship between publicity and the quality 
of deliberation as “the absence of publicity often limits 
deliberative capacity” (Mansbridge & Parkinson, 2012, p. 
11; see also Chambers, 2004, p. 389). Mansbridge & Par-
kinson (2012) note that since topics of deliberations are 
“issues of common concern…epistemically well-
grounded preferences, opinions, and decisions must be 
informed by, and take into consideration, the prefer-
ences and opinions of fellow citizens”. This gives a dif-
ferent set of expectations to communication in public, 
front-stage settings: Where cynics would expect delib-
erations on the use and role of expertise by the Com-
mission to take place primarily back stage, deliberativ-
ists will anticipate deliberation and reasoning in the 
Commission’s public communications.3 
Moreover, some deliberativists would anticipate 
greater deliberation within an EU context than at the 
national level (Eriksen, 2014; see also Joerges, 2001) 
because the EU is a “government without a state” 
(Eriksen & Fossum, 2012) and thus lacks the conven-
tional coercive means of states. According to this read-
ing of the EU project, EU integration, policy and deci-
sion-making is “non-coercive” and characterized by 
“learning and pragmatic problem-solving”: “when the 
instruments of power are lacking, actors have to sort 
out their differences through argumentation in order 
to find a solution to a common problem” (Eriksen, 
2014, p. 33). If so, the Commission is once more a most 
likely case: If a fit with the deliberative approach is to 
be found anywhere, it must be in the Commission’s 
communications, considering this organization’s role as 
pursuer of EU integration. 
Specific deliberative hypotheses (DH) regarding the 
Commission’s public communication on its use of ex-
pertise can be deduced from this branch of theory and 
contrasted with the cynical hypotheses outlined above. 
Concerning the approach to its critics’ positions, we 
could expect the Commission to agree or disagree with 
their views on instrumental knowledge utilization 
(DH1a), democratization (DH1b) and strategic uses of 
expertise (DH1c), depending on what it finds reasona-
ble. As for inconsistencies in critics’ arguments, the 
general expectation would be that the Commission ad-
dresses them if it finds good reasons to do so, including 
the possible goal conflict between instrumental 
knowledge utilization and critics’ democratization de-
                                                          
3 A key discussion in contemporary deliberative theory con-
cerns the more exact scope conditions for the positive relation-
ship between publicity and deliberative quality (see Chambers, 
2004; Thompson, 2008). The ambition here is, however, to give 
a coherent presentation of a theoretical account with compet-
ing expectations to public communication relative to those of 
the cynical approach. Just like organizational theory, deliberative 
theory is a broad scholarly tradition, but a more detailed presen-
tation and assessment falls beyond the scope of this article. 
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mands (DH2a). Finally, with regard to unpleasant topics 
for the Commission, we could anticipate potentially 
undemocratic features of current Commission ar-
rangements (DH3a), as well as any politicized 
knowledge utilization practices (DH3b), to be recog-
nized and openly discussed (see Table 1). 
4. Data and Methodological Reflections 
To test these hypotheses we have analyzed publicly 
available Commission documents. The documents that 
form the basis of our analysis include working docu-
ments, white papers, reports, action plans, framework 
papers, communications, and regulatory documents on 
principles and guidelines for the use and organization 
of expertise (European Commission, 2000, 2001a, 
2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2005, 2007, 2010a, 2010b, 2012, 
2013). The final selection is the result of a wide search 
for documents that deal with the use and role of exper-
tise in EU policy-making, and several of them are 
framed specifically as a direct response to the prob-
lems and criticisms raised by external actors. Most of 
the documents approach the topic generally, discussing 
“knowledge and society”, “democratizing expertise”, 
etc. as broader topics, while others discuss concrete 
expertise arrangements and expert advice procedures. 
As the Commission’s system of expert groups have 
been a main target of critics, we have traced docu-
ments on this system in particular. 
The documents cover the time period from 2000 to 
2013. They reflect, therefore, an ongoing discussion over 
a 13 year period, and not merely a snapshot of the 
Commission’s position at a certain moment in time. The 
selected documents are all within the range of what we 
could meaningfully refer to as this executive organiza-
tion’s “public communication”. They are fully available in 
the public realm to all those who wish to consult them, 
and due to the heated debates on the Commission’s use 
of expertise we could expect them to be scrutinized by a 
range of actors. The Commission may of course hold 
“private” views that are not covered by the documents. 
The documents are, finally, what the Commission com-
municates on its expertise policies and practices. This 
does not necessarily reflect what it does in practice. 
In our analysis of these documents, we have sys-
tematically coded passages to assess the relative mer-
its of the cynical and deliberative hypotheses. The 
method applied is qualitative content analysis.4 In ac-
cordance with this approach, the hypotheses are in 
part deduced from theory, and in part the result of da-
ta familiarization. CH/DH2a can serve as an example. 
Silence/deliberation on potential conflicts within the 
critics’ agenda is a theoretically deduced indicator, 
while the fully-fledged operational hypothesis on the 
instrumental knowledge utilization/democratization 
conflict is the product of a hermeneutical back and 
forth process between theory and documentary read-
ing. To increase coding reliability, both authors have 
searched and coded the documents. Coded passages 
with multiple possible meanings have been highlighted 
and taken up for explicit discussion among the authors 
in the assessment process. 
                                                          
4 See Mayring (2000), but also Hsieh and Shannon (2005) on 
“the directed approach”. 
Table 1. List of hypotheses about the European Commission’s public communication on its use of expertise 
Cynical hypotheses (CH) on Commission  
communication 
Deliberative hypotheses (DH) on Commission 
communication 
CH1a Agreement with critics’ support  of 
instrumental knowledge utilization 
DH1a Agreement or disagreement with critics’ 
support of instrumental knowledge 
utilization 
CH1b Agreement with critics’ demands for 
democratization 
DH1b Agreement or disagreement with critics’ 
demands for democratization 
CH1c Agreement with critics’ dismissal of 
politicized knowledge utilization 
DH1c Agreement or disagreement with critics’ 
dismissal of politicized knowledge utilization 
CH2a Silence on instrumental knowledge 
utilization/democratization conflict 
DH2a Deliberation on instrumental knowledge 
utilization/democratization conflict 
CH3a Silence on undemocratic features of  the 
Commission’s ongoing expertise practices 
DH3a Deliberation on undemocratic features of the 
Commission’s ongoing expertise practices 
CH3b Silence on the strategic uses of knowledge 
within the Commission’s own ranks 
DH3b Deliberation on the strategic uses of 
knowledge within the Commission’s own 
ranks 
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5. Findings and Discussion 
5.1. CH/DH1a and CH/DH1c: The Commission 
Subscribes To Instrumental Knowledge Utilization  
and Denounces Non-Instrumental Political Uses of 
Expertise 
The official function of expertise in policy-making is the 
instrumental, and it is perhaps not surprising that the 
Commission, just as their critics, subscribe without 
much ambivalence to the idea that expert bodies and 
expert advice should contribute to problem-solving and 
enlightenment. The Commission strives to make their 
activities and policies “knowledge-based”: “(…) it is 
crucial that policy choices are based and updated on 
the best available knowledge”, and “the right expertise 
at the right time” (European Commission, 2002a), to 
ensure “better quality decision-making” (European 
Commission, 2001b). Like its critics, the Commission al-
so expresses concern about the strategic, politicized 
use of expertise. It recognizes firmly the “risk” of par-
tial and selective knowledge utilization and of “policy-
makers just listening to one side of the argument or of 
particular groups getting privileged access” (European 
Commission, 2002b). 
These findings are equally compatible with a cynical 
and a deliberative approach. The Commission’s posi-
tions can be built on reason-based conviction, but can 
also reflect an opportunistic, superficial adaption to 
critics’ agenda with the aim of easing external pres-
sure. Abstract, evaluative passages where the Commis-
sion states its support for “the best available 
knowledge”, for “quality” of “expertise”, “scientific ex-
pertise”, “policies” and “decisions”, and for “impartiali-
ty” and “neutrality” in expert selection and knowledge-
production, easily lend themselves to cynical interpre-
tations: These are low risk statements acknowledging 
“everyone’s” concern.5 
However, the definite regulatory character of some 
of the documents, gives leverage to a deliberative in-
terpretation. In these documents, general talk of “qual-
ity”, “transparency” and “accountability” of expertise is 
operationalized and made concrete via specific rules 
and regulations. The Commission promises to “publish 
guidelines on collection and use of expert advice so 
that it is clear what advice is given, where it is coming 
from, how it used and what alternative views are avail-
able” (European Commission, 2001a), adding to al-
ready existing measures—consensus conferences, citi-
zens’ juries and science shops—put in place to ensure 
more “impartial” and “democratized” expertise and 
expertise consultation processes (European Commis-
sion, 2000a, 2001b, 2002a). The Commission goes on 
to introduce a number of minimum requirements in re-
lation to expert group composition: “When defining 
                                                          
5 See also Gallie (1956) on “essentially contested concepts”. 
the composition of expert groups, the Commission and 
its departments shall aim at ensuring a balanced repre-
sentation of relevant areas of expertise and areas of in-
terest, as well as a balanced representation of gender 
and geographical location” (European Commission, 
2005). More specifically, “where the Commission or its 
departments appoint the members of the expert 
groups, they shall seek a balance between men and 
women; the medium term aim shall be to have at least 
40% of representatives of each gender in each expert 
group” (European Commission, 2005). And finally, 
“(w)hen creating the expert group, the DG concerned 
shall describe the composition of the group in general, 
indicating categories of experts forming part of it: na-
tional, regional or local public authority represented, 
civil society organization represented, interested par-
ties, scientific or academic experts” (European Com-
mission, 2005).6  
Critics may, of course, disagree with some of these 
guidelines, consider them too weak or unambitious to 
protect the quality of expert advice from politicization 
and strategic use, or question the extent to which the 
Commission implements them effectively, or even in-
tends to implement them effectively. However, these 
minimum requirements exist and provide a benchmark 
on which the Commission can be judged. They might 
not fully satisfy critics, but their existence creates a re-
strictive barrier against the non-instrumental uses of 
expertise making the development of “imbalanced” 
groups, consisting exclusively, or predominantly, of ex-
perts supporting the Commission’s predetermined pol-
icy positions more complicated. In this regard, a cynical 
reading of the Commission’s public communication on 
expertise has limited applicability. 
5.2. CH/DH1b and CH/DH2a: The Commission 
Challenges Critics’ Demands for Democratization and 
Addresses Potential Conflicts between Instrumental 
Knowledge Utilization and the Democratization of 
Expertise 
The Commission highlights its support for “democracy” 
and “democratizing expertise”; “(…) it (the Commis-
sion) wishes to stress that it will maintain an inclusive 
approach” to expert advice, “in line with the principle 
of open governance: Every individual citizen, enterprise 
or association will continue to be able to provide the 
Commission with input” (European Commission, 
2002b), and “all relevant interests in society should 
have the opportunity to express their views” (European 
Commission, 2002b). Once more, such general state-
                                                          
6 In addition to these regulatory minimum requirements, the 
Commission outlines, within Status Reports, compositional 
changes to expert groups specifically identified by the Europe-
an Parliament and pressure groups as being unbalanced (Euro-
pean Commission, 2012, 2013).  
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ments fit well with a cynical reading of public docu-
ments. Statements of this nature may be based on 
conviction; they do not falsify deliberative expecta-
tions, but give deliberativists little to work with. 
The Commission’s overall message with regard to 
the democratization is, however, more complex. There 
are, firstly, the proposed regulations and reforms of 
the Commission’s expertise arrangements with the aim 
of “democratizing” expertise as well as increasing 
“quality” and “impartiality”: The introduction of bind-
ing requirements on gender balance, national composi-
tion, civil society participation, etc., decreases the im-
pression of superficial responsiveness (European 
Commission, 2005; see also previous subsection). 
Secondly, in these Commission documents, there is 
an ongoing explicit engagement with the relationship 
between instrumental knowledge utilization and par-
ticipatory ideals. The Commission notes that expertise 
reliance and expert advice, if framed and institutional-
ized adequately, can go hand in hand with a democra-
tization of knowledge utilization: “(…) by fulfilling its 
duty to consult, the Commission ensures that its pro-
posals are technically viable, practically workable and 
based on a bottom-up approach. In other words, good 
consultation serves a dual purpose by helping improve 
the quality of the policy outcome and at the same time 
enhancing the involvement of interested parties and 
the public at large” (European Commission, 2002a). 
Stress is here put on what is regarded as a positive 
relationship between greater epistemic diversity—or 
“knowledge plurality”—and high quality of policy out-
puts: “The final determinant of quality is pluralism. 
Wherever possible, a diversity of viewpoints should be 
assembled. This diversity may result from differences 
in scientific approach, different types of expertise, dif-
ferent institutional affiliations, or contrasting opinions 
over fundamental assumptions underlying the issue” 
(European Commission, 2002a). A central indicator of 
“plurality” is that expertise extends beyond scientific 
knowledge, including also practical and ethical 
knowledge. This will contribute to high quality deci-
sions that are sufficiently “socially robust” (“(t)he ob-
jective is to deliver knowledge for decision-making that 
is socially robust”): “This implies a notion of expertise 
that embraces diverse forms of knowledge (plurality). 
Expertise should be multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral 
and (…) include input from academic experts, stake-
holders, and civil society”, as well as from individual cit-
izens (“ordinary members of the public, once they have 
all the information in their possession”) (European 
Commission, 2000a), and expertise review that goes 
“beyond the traditional peer community, including, for 
example, scrutiny by those possessing local or practical 
knowledge, or those with an understanding of ethical 
aspects” (European Commission, 2001b).  
The next step of the argument is to link this idea of 
“socially robust” high quality decisions through the 
promotion of epistemic diversity to a democratic lexi-
con relating to “democratization”, “participation”, “in-
volvement”, “transparency”, “accountability” and “bot-
tom-up” control: “(T)he quality of EU policy depends 
on ensuring wide spread participation throughout the 
policy chain” (European Commission, 2001a), and “in-
volvement of interested parties through a transparent 
consultation process, which will enhance the Commis-
sion’s accountability” (European Commission, 2002b). 
The Commission wants to ensure that “its proposals 
are technically viable, practically workable and based 
on a bottom-up approach. In other words, good con-
sultation serves a dual purpose by helping improve the 
quality of the policy outcome and at the same time en-
hancing the involvement of interested parties and the 
public at large” (European Commission, 2002a). In 
short: in the Commission’s communications, expertise-
based policy-making and enhanced democracy are 
simultaneously possible and desirable. 
One may agree or disagree with the Commission’s 
views, but its position has seemingly come about after 
some argumentative work reflected in many of the 
documents; in particular, in the “Taking European 
Knowledge Society Seriously” expert group report (Eu-
ropean Commission, 2007), which discusses recent ac-
ademic research on the epistemic merits of cognitive 
pluralism. Cynics could, however, question the depth 
and sincerity of these deliberations7, and take them to 
be a somewhat more sophisticated variant of low risk 
“smooth talk” framed to make critics satisfied.  
However, parallel to the harmonizing picture out-
lined above, runs a story of how “democratization” and 
“participation”, if taken too far or institutionalized in 
the wrong way, could be an obstacle to effective expert 
advice and knowledge-based policy-making. Following 
this line of reasoning, increased decision quality and 
the democratization of expertise are no longer two 
sides of the same coin. Rather, the Commission admits, 
the twin concerns of “legitimacy and efficiency” may 
entail some potential “trade-offs” (European Commis-
sion, 2001b), and the need to create a balance be-
tween “adequate input” and “swift decision-making” 
(European Commission 2002b). 
One expression of this non-harmonizing approach is 
the Commission’s apparent need to put some limits on 
the transparency and democratization agenda in order 
to maintain knowledge-based and swift decision-
making. Concerns of this kind are reflected in general 
remarks on expertise and what a sound, “balanced” 
approach to expert advice would look like; for example, 
                                                          
7 A cynic would not have to doubt the real engagement and 
sincerity of the 2007 expert group report authors, several of 
them prominent academics in their field. What they would ar-
gue, rightfully or not, is that the Commission uses this report 
strategically to give its “smooth talk” on the use and role of ex-
pertise some apparent grounding. 
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with regard to “openness”: “(…) there are circumstanc-
es when too much openness could be detrimental to 
the quality of advice, or may damage the legitimate in-
terest of those concerned with the process. The level 
of openness should be tailored in proportion to the 
task at hand” (European Commission, 2002a). Discus-
sions relating to the potential limits of “democratizing 
expertise” also come up directly in relation to the ex-
pert group system and the guidelines for this system. 
There is, for example, a concern that the desire for 
greater participation may lead to overcrowding in 
groups which will compromise their effectiveness and 
problem-solving capacities. There is, therefore, a need 
to “ensure that an excessive multiplication of expert 
groups is avoided”, and that “the number of members 
in the group” remains “limited in order to guarantee 
the effective operation of the group and ensure the 
quality of expertise” (European Commission, 2005).  
Finally, there are passages where the Commission 
suggests that critics’ demands for democratization are 
normatively and institutionally misplaced, or at least 
potentially in tension with sound intuition about how 
knowledge should be utilized and the nature of democ-
racy in the EU. An example of this is the Commission’s 
concern that the idea of “democratizing expertise” is 
understood as an idea of “majority voting in science”, 
that expert advice is dismissed and considered illegiti-
mate if it is not in accordance with majority views. The 
Commission is also uneasy with how its use of exper-
tise has been made a key target of critics of the EU’s 
democratic deficit when the main challenges to the 
deficit arguably lie elsewhere. There may be “no con-
tradiction between wide consultation and the concept 
of representative democracy. However, it goes without 
saying that, first and foremost, the decision-making 
process in the EU is legitimized by the elected repre-
sentatives of the European people” (European Com-
mission, 2002b). The contention here is that propo-
nents of the democratization of the expertise approach 
tend to confuse the democratic deficit debate, fixating 
on the Commission and ignoring the larger institutional 
context and the fundamental role, not least, of the Eu-
ropean Parliament and the Council for developing EU 
democracy and problematically replacing the norma-
tive ideal of “representative democracy” with that of 
“consultation” democracy.  
Again, one may or may not share these worries and 
be more or less convinced by the Commission’s trade-
off arguments, and as they are discussed symbiotically 
with a harmonization discourse, the idea of a hard 
choice between democratization and instrumental 
knowledge utilization is articulated with considerable 
ambivalence. There is no doubt, however, that the 
Commission problematizes the democracy, accounta-
bility and transparency demands of critics substantive-
ly. There are few traces of cosmetic or hypocritical re-
sponses to critics’ concerns on this point; on the 
contrary, Commission critics, their agenda and parame-
ters are challenged and critically engaged with in a way 
that fits badly with a cynical reading. 
5.3. CH/DH3a and CH/DH3b: The Commission Tends  
to Avoid the Unpleasant Topics of Internal Democratic 
Deficiencies and Politicized Uses of Expertise within Its 
Own Ranks  
The Commission documents provide, however, no de-
scriptions, analyses or assessments of the Commis-
sion’s current practices of expert organization and ad-
vice from a democratic perspective. The Commission 
subscribes generally to ideals of democracy and of de-
mocratizing expert bodies and procedures despite its 
concern that “too much” of this or using it “in the 
wrong way” could compromise problem-solving merits. 
Several of the proposed regulations of the Commis-
sion’s expert arrangements, moreover, indirectly rec-
ognize critics’ democratic concerns. As we have argued, 
all these findings give leverage to a deliberative reading 
of the documents. Scrutiny of the Commission’s ongo-
ing internal practices from a democratic point of view 
could, however, have brought attention to democratic 
deficiencies, in the eye of critics, but also in the eye of 
the Commission itself. When the documents avoid this 
issue, this is accordance with cynical expectations of 
avoiding unpleasant topics. 
The topic of politicized use of expertise within the 
Commission’s own ranks is also avoided, exactly as cyn-
ics would anticipate. Once more, the Commission rec-
ognizes the problem in general terms. The problem of 
selective and opportunistic use of expertise is dis-
cussed and problematic implications are highlighted, 
varying from reduced public “trust” in expert arrange-
ments and a decrease in “the credibility of science” to 
lower quality policy outcomes (European Commission, 
2001b). And, once more, the problem is recognized in-
directly through the introduction of concrete regulato-
ry prescriptions. A focused discussion and assessment 
of the Commission’s non-instrumental knowledge utili-
zation practices as a characteristic of this organization 
and something concretely and ongoing, is however 
missing from the documents. Such practices have been 
identified in research on the Commission’s use of ex-
pertise, and they are most likely well known among 
Commission officials themselves. When they are not 
recognized and addressed, this is in accordance with 
the cynical expectation of avoiding delicate and diffi-
cult issues. 
6. Conclusions and Precautions 
Overall, we can conclude that cynical expectations are 
in accordance with a dominant interpretative scheme 
among Commission critics, and supported by a branch 
of organizational theory, but only partially supported 
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by our data. Firstly, even if the Commission’s support 
for instrumental knowledge utilization and firm dismis-
sal of the strategic uses of expertise is compatible with 
a cynical reading, the introduction of concrete regula-
tory initiatives by the Commission to ensure neutrality 
and problem-solving credentials in its expert advice 
practices gives leverage to a deliberative approach. 
Secondly, the Commission problematizes critics’ de-
mocratization demands and addresses possible contra-
dictions between these demands and the concern for 
high quality decisions and good policy outcomes. These 
findings indicate deliberation and counter the expecta-
tions of the cynical approach. Cynical hypotheses about 
the Commission’s approach to unpleasant topics are, 
however, strengthened. 
The partial confirmation of deliberative hypotheses 
is not totally unsurprising and supports existing studies 
of the Commission that already challenge the cynical 
perspective (Cini, 2014; Cram, 1994; Heritier, 1999; Kas-
sim, 2008; Pollack, 2003; Wille, 2013). Our study also 
adds to existing scholarship on deliberation in EU policy 
and decision-making (Eriksen, 2009, 2014; Eriksen & 
Fossum, 2012; Joerges, 2001; Sjursen, 2011; Stie, 2013). 
A promising branch of EU deliberation studies have 
developed the quality of deliberation indicators, which 
makes it possible to measure the more detailed levels 
and characteristics of deliberation (Bächtiger, Niemey-
er, Neblo, Steenbergen, & Steiner, 2010; see also 
Neblo, 2007). We did not apply such indicator sets in 
our study because our aim was to compare the relative 
merits of a cynical and a deliberative approach, and 
high scores on deliberative indicators often lend them-
selves equally well to both cynical and deliberative 
readings, i.e. it is notoriously hard to say whether 
“good arguments” in public communication reflect “a 
commitment to public reasoning” (Cohen, 1997), or a 
cynical attempt to look like a “good deliberator”. 
Furthermore, what we have assessed in this article 
are particular branches and interpretations of organiza-
tional and deliberative theory and a limited set of hy-
potheses. Our attention has, moreover, been on the 
Commission’s communications about its expertise poli-
cies and practices and not on actual implementation. Ob-
viously, more studies are needed to get a fuller picture.  
Finally, we believe our findings raise significant nor-
mative questions. One is whether critics are right in dis-
missing strategic practices of knowledge utilization out-
right, or whether a normative case can be made for such 
practices that are no doubt ongoing in the Commission 
and other executive organizations. Another is whether 
the Commission is right to keep so quiet about it. 
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